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I. INTRODUCTION
An often overlooked yet potentially fruitful area of litiga-
tion for the New York criminal defense attorney concerns utiliz-
ing the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (the "Vienna
Convention")1 in the representation of foreign nationals. The
criminal defense attorney should thus have a familiarity with
both the legal and factual issues involved in the interplay be-
tween state law and the rights of the noncitizen criminal defen-
dant to consular notification and access derived under the
t Supervising Attorney, The Legal Aid Society, Criminal Defense Division,
New York, NY; former Adjunct Professor of Law, New York Law School; J.D. 1991,
University of California, Hastings College of the Law.
ft Managing Partner, Bigelow & Narra, LLC., NY and NJ; former Supervis-
ing Attorney, The Legal Aid Society, Criminal Defense Division, New York, NY
and Adjunct Professor of Law, New York Law School; J.D. 1993, Georgetown Uni-
versity Law Center.
1 See Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77,
596 U.N.T.S. 261 [hereinafter the Vienna Convention, the Convention, or the
Treaty].
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Vienna Convention. 2 The Vienna Convention has received in-
creasing attention in the context of criminal litigation in the
United States, due in part to the expanding influence of inter-
national law in domestic courts generally and in part to the ex-
tent that it has been successfully used as a vehicle in the
litigation of death penalty cases. 3 The Vienna Convention how-
ever, transcends capital cases4 and applies in any instance in
which a foreign national has been detained, arrested or impris-
oned.5 This express reference to matters bearing squarely upon
fundamental issues of domestic criminal procedure has also
contributed to the burgeoning of litigation in this area for well
over a decade. 6 Somewhat surprisingly, litigation under the Vi-
enna Convention in New York state practice has been remarka-
bly sparse in light of the relatively steady maintenance of a
noncitizen prison population of better than ten percent since at
least 2002. 7 Given its broad application however, the Vienna
Convention is extremely valuable to defense attorneys and
should always be considered in the defense of foreign nationals.
This article discusses the litigation of Vienna Convention
claims in the context of New York state criminal proceedings.
Parts II and III provide a review of both the background and the
obligations arising under the Convention. Thereafter, the arti-
cle is divided principally into two substantive sections. The
2 Article 36 provides in part that "consular officers shall be free to communi-
cate with nationals of the sending State and to have access to them. Nationals of
the sending State shall have the same freedom with respect to communication
with and access to consular officers of the sending State." Id. art. 36, 21 U.S.T. at
100, 596 U.N.T.S. at 292.
3 See infra pp. 10-11 and note 36 (providing U.S. cases that involve issues
arising under the Vienna Convention).
4 See Kelly Trainer, The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations in the
United States Courts, 13 TRANSNAT'L LAw. 227, 230-31 (2000) (noting, in addition
to capital cases, several cases involving immigration and narcotics raising Article
36 violations).
5 See Vienna Convention, supra note 1, art. 36(1)(b), 21 U.S.T. at 101, 596
U.N.T.S. at 292.
6 See cases cited infra note 36.
7 Three reports published by the U.S. Department of Justice indicate that
noncitizen prisoners accounted for over ten-percent of New York State's prison
population. See Bureau of Justice Statistics, Prison and Jail Inmates at Midyear
2004, Bulletin No. NCJ 208801; Bureau of Justice Statistics, Prison and Jail In-
mates at Midyear 2003, Bulletin No. NCJ 203947; Bureau of Justice Statistics
Prison and Jail Inmates at Midyear 2002, Bulletin No. NCJ 198877. These three
reports are all available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pubalp2.htm.
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first section, Part IV (divided into subparts 'A', 'B' and 'C') ad-
dresses matters concerning the general application of the Vi-
enna Convention and attendant issues. Subpart A discusses
the question of whether, by its terms, the Convention gives rise
to an individually enforceable right to consular notification and
access and, will suggest that an examination of the legislative
history and circumstances underlying the adoption of the Con-
vention lends clear support to the existence of an individual
right of detained foreign nationals to be promptly informed of
their right to consular notification and that the breach of this
obligation by the authorities may be properly vindicated in the
courts. To the extent that the relevant provisions of the Con-
vention are well recognized as self-executing, they are entitled
to judicial enforcement without the need for any implementing
legislation and should thus be fully enforced in state courts as a
matter of federal law and through the application of principles
of customary international law.8 Subpart 'B' discusses the ap-
plication of the Convention in the context of the state statutory
scheme concerning the suppression of evidence, specifically
statements. Here, this article will argue that, assuming the
conferral of an individual right of enforcement by the Conven-
tion, the absence of a textual reference as to precisely when the
required notice must be given cannot alone foreclose the issue
as to the voluntariness of the statement obtained. To the extent
that advisement of the right to consular notification is required
to be given under international law where it becomes apparent
that an individual detainee might be a foreign national, a fac-
tual issue as to whether such notice must precede an official
interrogation or a subsequently obtained statement pursuant to
the terms of the Convention is clearly raised. Accordingly, since
the particular circumstances of a case may give rise to the right
to consular notification well in advance of an interrogation or
statement, the failure of the State to abide by its obligation
under the Convention directly impacts upon the question of vol-
untariness in the traditional sense. Subpart C discusses the
courts' varied treatment of Article 36 claims and remedies and
will argue that substantive breaches of the Convention warrant
the imposition of meaningful judicial sanctions and remedies in
state court in contemplation of the significance, uniformity of
8 See infra note 41 and accompanying text.
20061
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application and intended purpose of the treaty amongst the
states parties. Ultimately, the second section, Part V discusses
the practical implications and considerations in raising Vienna
Convention claims. Here, the article will argue that raising Vi-
enna Convention claims serves several important and poten-
tially beneficial functions in the representation of noncitizens,
ranging from assistance in garnering evidence abroad, to facili-
tating communication, to advising a given defendant early in
the process about the nuances of a system in which they often
find themselves at a distinct disadvantage. This article con-
cludes, recognizing that whether treaty rights are interposed as
a means of involving the foreign consulate as a bridge to facili-
tate the relationship between attorney and client; as a tool to
demand or acquire useful pretrial discovery and preserve issues
for appellate review; to simply assert factual grounds poten-
tially leading to the expansion of hearing or trial issues; or more
hopefully, to obtain a meaningful remedy in the case of their
breach-a fundamental understanding of Article 36 of the Con-
vention is essential to the representation of foreign nationals in
state proceedings.
II. BACKGROUND
The Vienna Convention is a seventy-nine article multilat-
eral treaty to which there are currently 167 parties, including
the United States.9 Primarily, the Convention expresses uni-
versally recognized consular norms as derived from principles of
customary international law. 10 Article 36 of the Convention is
entitled "Communication and Contact with Nationals of the
9 See The International Justice Report, The Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations, available at http://www.internationaljusticeproject.org/nationalsinstru-
ments.cfin (last visited Feb. 22, 2006).
10 See Mark J. Kadish, Article 36 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations: A
Search for the Right to Consul, 18 MICH. J. INT'L L. 565, 568 (1997) (for a detailed
exposition of the history of the Vienna Convention); see also William J. Aceves, The
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations: A Study of Rights, Wrongs, and Reme-
dies, 31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 257, 263 (1998); see also Declaration on the
Human Rights of Individuals Who are not Nationals of the Country in which They
Live, G.A. Res. 40/144, Annex, 40 U.N. GAOR, 40th Sess., Supp. No. 53, at 252,
U.N. Doc. A/40/53 (1985) (recognizing the fundamental nature of the consular in-
stitution and providing that "[a]ny alien shall be free at any time to communicate
with the consulate or diplomatic mission of the State of which he or she is a na-
tional"). Id. art. 10.
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Sending State" and is principally concerned with the discharge
of consular functions regarding the nationals of States Parties
that have been ". . arrested or committed to prison or to cus-
tody pending trial or [have been] detained in any other man-
ner."11  Under such circumstances, Article 36 generally
obligates the host State to advise the foreign national of his
right to have his consul notified. 12 The substance of these pro-
visions are held to be so fundamental as to apply in one form or
another to even to those countries that have not yet ratified the
Convention.' 3 The United States however, ratified the Conven-
tion, together with its Optional Protocol' 4 (a treaty in its own
right) in 1969,15 rendering them part of the supreme law of the
land under the Supremacy Clause of the federal Constitution.16
In the intervening thirty-six years the United States has
submitted itself to the compulsory jurisdiction of the Interna-
11 See Vienna Convention, supra note 1, art. 36(1)(b), 21 U.S.T. at 101, 596
U.N.T.S. at 292.
12 See Roberto Iraola, Federal Criminal Prosecutions and the Right to Consu-
lar Notification Under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention, 105 W. VA. L. REV. 179,
184 (2002).
13 See U.S. Department of State, Pub. No. 10518, CONSULAR NOTIFICATION
AND ACCESS: INSTRUCTIONS FOR FEDERAL, STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT
AND OTHER OFFICIALS REGARDING FOREIGN NATIONALS IN THE UNITED STATES AND
THE RIGHTS OF CONSULAR OFFICIALS TO ASSIST THEM, PART 5: LEGAL MATERIAL
(Jan., 1998), available at http://travel.state.gov/pdf/CNA-book.pdf (providing that
the U.S. State Department considers consular notification to be required under
customary international law in all cases, even if the detainee's home country has
not signed the Convention). See also Cara S. O'Driscoll, Comment, The Execution
of Foreign Nationals in Arizona: Violations of the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 323, 340 (2000) (noting that the U.S. regards "[airticle
36 obligations [as] of the highest order and should not be dealt with lightly").
14 See Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes,
Apr. 24, 1963, art. I, 21 U.S.T. 325, 326, 596 U.N.T.S. 487, 488 [hereinafter Op-
tional Protocol]. The Optional Protocol was proposed by United States in 1963 and
ratified together with the Convention in 1969. In 1979, the United States became
the first country to invoke the protocol. See Sean D. Murphy, ed., Implementation
of Avena Decision by Oklahoma Court, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 581 (2004); see also
United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States v. Iran),
1980 I.C.J. 64, [ 45-46 (May).
15 See 115 CONG. REC. 30997 (Oct. 22, 1969) (reflecting the unanimous advice
and consent of the U.S. Senate in the ratification of the Convention); see also Kad-
ish, supra note 10, at 568.
16 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (providing in part that "all Treaties made, or
which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the su-
preme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any
Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding");
see also Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 341 (1924).
20061
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tional Court of Justice ("ICJ") under the terms of the Optional
Protocol, which confers upon the ICJ the power to adjudicate
"disputes arising out of the interpretation or application of the
[Convention] "1 providing for what is in essence, a binding pro-
cess of arbitration.' 8 In March of 2005 however, the United
States signaled its intention to withdraw from the Optional Pro-
tocol. 19 With regard to the Convention itself, no similar action
has as yet been undertaken. On the contrary, the United States
has continued to reaffirm its commitment to the Convention. 20
While the current posture of the United States (assuming the
effectiveness of the intended withdrawal) may raise substantial
and novel questions as to whether the prior adjudications of the
ICJ in matters having arisen under the Optional Protocol are
prospectively binding, the resulting status of the obligations
under the Convention itself remain substantively unchanged. 21
In this respect the United States is not sui generis.22 Several
other countries remain fully bound to the provisions of the Con-
vention while simultaneously declaring themselves free of the
Optional Protocol.23
17 See Optional Protocol, supra note 14, art. I (providing that "[d]isputes aris-
ing out of the interpretation or application of the Convention shall lie within the
compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice").
18 See, e.g., Case Concerning Avena & Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v.
U.S.) 2004 I.C.J. 128 (Mar. 31, 2004), available at http://www.icj-cij.orgicjwww/
idocket/imus/imusframe.htm.
19 See Charles Lane, U.S. Quits Pact Used in Capital Cases: Foes of Death
Penalty Cite Access to Envoys, WASH. POST, Mar. 10, 2005, at Al (quoting U.S.
Secretary of State, Condoleeza Rice's letter to the U.N. Secretary General, Kofi
Annan which provided in part that "the United States of America... hereby with-
draws from the Optional Protocol." As a consequence, the United States will no
longer recognize the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice reflected in
that Protocol).
20 See U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT, BUREAU OF CONSuLAR AFFAIRS, ANNOUNCE-
MENT: ALL CONSULAR NOTIFICATION AND ACCESS REMAIN IN EFFECT (2005) availa-
ble at http://travel.state.gov/news/news_2155.html. (providing with regard to the
March 7, 2005, withdrawal from the Optional Protocol, "[tihe United States has
not withdrawn from the Vienna Consular Convention and remains committed to
its principles and provisions").
21 See id. ("tihe obligations of American law enforcement personnel regarding
consular notification and access for arrested or detained foreign nationals are un-
changed" following the withdrawal from the Optional Protocol).
22 The term is Latin for "of its own kind." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1164-65
(7th ed. 2000) (other definitions of the term include "its own class," unique, pecu-
liar). Id.
23 Currently, only around twenty seven percent of states parties to the Con-
vention are also parties to the Optional Protocol. See, United Nations, Optional
[Vol. 18:99
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While the question of whether the Convention itself creates
a private right to relief has not yet been resolved by the U.S.
Supreme Court 24 or for that matter, addressed by the New York
Court of Appeals, litigation in this area on the state level may
be nonetheless beneficial. Recognizing that there remains a
split as to whether the Convention may be invoked in an indi-
vidual capacity, "only a few courts have actually held that the
Vienna Convention does not confer a private right."25 Thus, the
litigation of Article 36 may be advantageous in the absence of a
definitive determination as to the status of the rights created by
the Convention.
Regardless of the extent to which the substantive provi-
sions of the Convention are implemented prospectively through
either direct judicial enforcement of the ICJ's decisions ren-
dered under the aegis of the Optional Protocol or through the
Convention itself (as a rule of decision); or whether they are
given effect by domestic courts on their own accord as a matter
of comity of sorts or in applying an independent interpretation
of the treaty provisions, it is particularly important that such
litigation be undertaken in an effort to secure an effective rem-
edy for the client.
III. ARTICLE 36 OBLIGATIONS
Article 36 (1) of the Vienna Convention imposes several
specific obligations upon the receiving state: First, subpara-
graph (a) requires the host country to permit consular officers
unfettered communication with and access to nationals of the
Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (providing that only 45
countries are parties to the Optional Protocol), (on file with author).
24 For the most part, federal courts have, in the absence of guidance from the
United States Supreme Court, continued to dodge the question of whether Article
36 creates individual rights. See Medellin v. Dretke, 125 S. Ct. 2088, 2102 (2005)
(citing Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 376 (1998) (per curiam) remarking that
Article 36 "arguably confers on an individual the right to consular assistance fol-
lowing arrest"). See e.g., United States v. Emuegbunam, 268 F.3d 377, 391 (6th
Cir. 2001), reh'g en banc denied, (Dec. 5, 2001); Emuegbunam v. United States, 535
U.S. 977 (2002); United States v. Lombera-Camorlinga, 206 F.3d 882, 885 (9th Cir.
2000); United States v. Li, 206 F.3d 56, 66 (1st Cir. 2000).
25 See Trainer, supra note 4, at 256 (noting that most courts "assume stand-
ing"); see also United States v. Chaparro-Alcantara, 37 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1124
(C.D. Ill. 1999) (noting that the plurality of cases on the issue hold that the Con-
vention confers individually enforceable rights).
2006]
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sending state, conferring upon such nationals a correlative re-
ciprocal entitlement. 26 Second, under subparagraph (b) the
competent authorities of the host country are required upon re-
quest of the foreign national to notify the appropriate consular
offices of the arrest, detention, custody, or imprisonment "with-
out delay. '27 Third, subparagraph (b) similarly requires the au-
thorities to forward any communication from the detained
person to their consulate. 28 Fourth, the authorities must ". . .in-
form the person concerned without delay of his rights under
[subparagraph bi. "29 Subparagraph (c) permits consular of-
ficers contact with a national in prison, custody or detention, to
converse and correspond with him and to arrange for his legal
representation.30 Though a given defendant's immigration sta-
tus may justifiably influence counsel's decision as to whether or
not to pursue an Article 36 claim, it is immaterial to the protec-
tion afforded under the Convention and the duties it imposes
upon domestic authorities.
Ordinarily, Convention violations occur in the context of
prosecutions or interrogations carried out against a foreign de-
fendant in derogation of Article 36. Thus, Article 36 claims are
generally advanced in at least two significant ways: First, as a
non-derivative or privately enforceable right emanating from a
'treaty' within the contemplation of the Supremacy Clause;31
and second, as a factor indicating the state statutory scheme
concerning evidentiary suppression, typically of statements as
discussed below. 32
IV. THE CONVENTION APPLIED
Although there is really no disagreement as to the binding
nature of the Convention, there remains a clear split on the is-
sue of whether Article 36 confers rights that may be asserted by
26 See Vienna Convention, supra note 1, art. 36(1)(a), 21 U.S.T. 77, 100-01,
596 U.N.T.S. 261, 292-93.
27 Id. art. 36(1)(b) (requiring that the receiving state "shall, without delay"
inform the consulate of the sending State if its national is arrested or detained
(emphasis added)).
28 Id.
29 Id. (emphasis added).
30 Id. art. 36(1)(c), 21 U.S.T. at 101, 596 U.N.T.S. at 292.
31 See discussion supra Part II; infra Part V.A.
32 See discussion infra Parts IV.B-C.
[Vol. 18:99
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a foreign national individually rather than by her govern-
ment.33 The courts have generally shown a reluctance to
squarely address the issue.34 However, those courts that have
addressed Article 36 have treated it as either establishing indi-
vidual rights but without warranting any meaningful remedy in
the absence of a showing of prejudice; as subject to a harmless
error analysis assuming the conferral of such rights; or as not
creating judicially enforceable rights at all.35 Still, most courts
have either assumed or implied the existence of judicially en-
forceable rights under the convention. 36
New York courts have similarly treated Article 36 claims. 37
However, there appears to be no state appellate authority de-
33 See, e.g., infra note 36 (noting the split between U.S. courts as to whether
Article 36 of the Vienna Convention confers individuals rights on foreign
nationals).
34 See infra note 36.
35 See Mark J. Kadish, Article 36 Of The Vienna Convention on Consular Rela-
tions: The International Court of Justice in Mexico v. United States (Avena) Speaks
Emphatically To The Supreme Court of the United States About the Fundamental
Nature of the Right to Consul, 36 GEO. J. INT'L L. 1, 9 (2004).
36 See Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 376 (1998); United States v. Torres-Del
Muro, 58 F. Supp. 2d 931,932-33 (C.D. Ill. 1999); United States v. Hongla-Yamche,
55 F. Supp. 2d 74, 77-78 (D. Mass. 1999); United States v. Alvarado-Torres, 45 F.
Supp. 2d 986, 989 (S.D. Cal. 1999); United States v. Superville, 40 F. Supp. 2d 672,
678 (D. Va. 1999); United States v. Chaparro-Alcantara, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 1125;
United States v. Briscoe, 69 F. Supp. 2d 738, 745 (D. Va. 1999), affd without pub-
lished opinion, 234 F.3d 1266 (3d Cir. 2000) (all recognizing that Article 36 confers
standing on individuals to challenge violations of the terms of the Convention); see
also United States v. Oropeza-Flores, 173 F.3d 862, at *2, 1999 WL 195261 (9th
Cir. 1999) (unpublished opinion); United States v. $69,530.00 in U.S. Currency, 22
F. Supp. 2d 593, 594 (W.D. Tex.1998) (both cases holding that foreign nationals
have standing to enforce their Article 36 rights in U.S. courts); compare United
States v. Salameh, 54 F.Supp.2d 236, 279-80 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (refusing to "wade
into the morass over the existence of [ ] a private right of action"), with Standt v.
City of New York, 153 F. Supp. 2d 417, 425 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (noting that "language
that more unequivocally establishe[d] that the protections of Article 36(1)(b) be-
long to the individual national" would be "difficult to imagine" and recognizing the
Convention's creation of a private right of action enforceable pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983); but see United States v. Jimenez-Nava, 243 F.3d 192, 198 (5th Cir. 2001)
(providing that the Convention confers no individual right in relying on the lan-
guage of its preamble indicating that it is 'not to benefit individuals' and its pri-
mary purpose being to facilitate consular relations).
37 People v. McLeod, 2004 WL 3078697, at *1 (2004) (impliedly finding the
creation of private rights but holding that suppression is not an appropriate rem-
edy for violations of Convention); People v. Alvarez Hernandez, 2002 WL
31109621, at *11 (N.Y. Crim. Ct.) (noting that a Convention violation is not a
ground for finding inapplicable the state death penalty statute or dismissing the
indictment); People v. Litarov, 727 N.Y.S.2d 293, 297 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2001) (declin-
9
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claring the unavailability of privately enforceable rights under
Article 36. To the contrary, the Appellate Division has in ancil-
lary consideration of the issue either assumed or implied the
existence of such rights.38 In addition, both the application of
customary international law as well as the Supremacy Clause
may otherwise compel state courts to recognize judicially en-
forceable rights under the Convention.
A. Privately Enforceable Rights
As a party to the Vienna Convention as well as the Op-
tional Protocol, the United States undertook substantive obliga-
tions toward foreign nationals and to give such obligations legal
effect. 39 Because the Convention as well as its Optional Proto-
col are fully ratified treaties they are on par vis A vis the states
with constitutional and federal statutory law.40 The Vienna
Convention is also well recognized as self-executing.41 As such,
it may be judicially enforced without the need for implementing
ing to impose a remedy for the violation of Article 36 on the grounds that "invoca-
tion of the right to consular notification under Article 36 would essentially exempt
foreign nationals from taking a breathalyzer test since it could take days, not less
than two hours, before a consular official would be available to consult with a de-
fendant"). Notice, however, that this holding seems to be predicated upon an im-
plicit recognition that the right of consular notification really requires an effective
ability of the foreign national to seek the advice of his consul prior to the waiver of
rights.
38 See People v. Ortiz, 795 N.Y.S.2d 182, 191 (App. Div. 2005) (noting in dicta
that suppression is not an appropriate remedy for a convention violation "assum-
ing that the treaty confers such individual rights"); Howithi v. Travis, 796
N.Y.S.2d 195, 196 ( App. Div. 2005) (denying the assertion of Vienna Convention
claims as not properly before the court in an Article 78 proceeding without ad-
dressing the status of treaty rights); People v. Elkady, 731 N.Y.S.2d 472, 473 (App.
Div. 2001) (denying an Article 36 claim on grounds of procedural default and not-
ing that the absence of prejudice "to the extent that the treaty does confer any
individually enforceable rights"); Walker v. Pataki, 698 N.Y.S.2d 624, 625 (App.
Div. 1999) (impliedly recognizing a private right of enforcement in noting that the
Convention "does not require that [an application for post conviction reliefl be en-
tertained outside the context of the Criminal Procedure Law").
39 By ratifying the Vienna Convention, the United States gave legal effect to
its contents pursuant to the Supremacy Clause. See generally supra notes 20-23
and accompanying text.
40 See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 18 (1957) (noting that "Act of Congress... is
on a full parity with a treaty"); see also Breard, 523 U.S. at 376.
41 See S. REP. No. 91-9, app., at 5 (1969) (statement of State Department Dep-
uty Legal Adviser J. Edward Lyerly) (testifying at a Senate hearing prior to ratifi-
cation that the treaty is 'entirely self-executive[sic] and does not require any
implementing or complementing legislation').
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol18/iss1/4
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legislation.42 While individual rights arising out of treaties are
generally "derivative through the states" 43 as a matter of inter-
national law, the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that a
treaty may, in certain instances create privately enforceable
rights.44 Indeed, the Court has "repeatedly enforced treaty-
based rights of individual foreigners"45 including provisions of
the Vienna Convention relating to consular privileges and im-
munities.46 Though a self-executing treaty does not necessarily
create a private right of enforcement by virtue of that fact
alone,47 such a right may be determined through an analysis of
its text, 48 an examination of the travaux preparatoire4 9 and by
resorting to customary international law. Accordingly, where a
42 See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 252
(1984) ("no domestic legislation is required to give [it] the force of law in the United
States"); United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 875 (5th Cir. 1979); see also
Whitney v. Robertson, 8 S. Ct. 456, 458 (1888) (providing that treaties affect do-
mestic law only if they are self-executing or given such effect by legislation); Foster
& Elam v. Nielson, 27 U.S. 253, 314 (1829) (self-executing treaty is "equivalent to
an act of the legislature").
43 See United States v. De La Pava, 268 F.3d 157, 164 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting
United States ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62, 67 (2d Cir. 1975)); United
States v. Li, 206 F.3d 56, 60 (1st Cir. 2000); Matta-Ballesteros v. Henman, 896
F.2d 255, 259 (7th Cir. 1990); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELA-
TIONS LAw § 907, cmt. a (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)] (providing that
"international agreements ... generally do not create private rights or provide for
a cause of action in domestic courts").
44 See Edye v. Robertson, 112 U.S. 580, 598 (1884) ("Head Money Cases"); see
also Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134, 1146 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (recognizing
that "individuals may sue for treaty violations only if the treaty is self-executing")
(Randolph, J., concurring).
45 Medellin v. Dretke, 125 S. Ct. 2088, 2104 (2005).
46 Id.
47 See Stefan R. Riesenfeld, The Doctrine of Self-Executing Treaties and U.S.
v. PostaL" Win At Any Price?, 74 AM. J. INT'L. L. 892, 896-97 (1980) (noting that
whether a treaty requires legislative implementation raises a separate issue than
whether it establishes norms to which the government is ultimately bound under
domestic law); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw § 111,
cmt. h (1987) ("[w]hether a treaty is self-executing is... distinct from whether the
treaty creates private rights or remedies").
48 See United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 663 (1992).
49 See Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., 516 U.S. 217, 226 (1996) (noting
that since a treaty is "an agreement among sovereign powers, we have tradition-
ally considered as aids to its interpretation the negotiating and drafting history
(travaux preparatoires)").
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treaty "expressly or by implication provides for a private right
of action," an individual may seek redress.50
To the extent that an examination of the legislative history
of a multilateral treaty is necessarily informed by the principle
that "the parties. . . inten[ded] that their respective courts
strive to interpret the treaty consistently," the court must "look
to decisions of other signatories ... [as] evidence of the original
shared understanding of the contracting parties."51 Thus, the
interpretation of international agreements by international
tribunals is properly entitled to "respectful consideration" by
the courts.52 Similarly, under state law, a treaty is to be "lib-
eral[ly] interpret[ed] to give effect to its apparent purposes."53
Some commentators have pointed out that in the case of the
Convention, the traveaux preparatoires clearly demonstrate the
intention of the drafters to confer individual rights under Arti-
cle 36.5 4 This is supported by the independent evaluation of the
legislative history and text by the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights ("IACHR") which has separately determined
50 Columbia Marine Services, Inc. v. Reffet Ltd., 861 F.2d 18, 21 (2d Cir. 1988)
(emphasis added).
51 Olympic Airways v. Husain, 540 U.S. 644, 660 (2004) (Scalia, J., O'Connor,
J., dissenting); see also United States v. Jimenez-Nava, 243 F.3d at 195 ("interna-
tional agreements should be consistently interpreted among the signatories"); Day
v. Trans World Airlines, 528 F.2d 31, 35 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied 429 U.S. 890
(1976); Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d 1079, 1090 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
922 (1977) (recognizing that multilateral treaties should be given a meaning con-
sistent with the shared expectations of the contracting parties).
52 See Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 375 (1998).
53 See Rosman v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 314 N.E.2d 848, 854 (N.Y. 1974)
(internal citations omitted); see Matter of Zalewski, 292 N.Y. 332, 336 (1944) (not-
ing that the words of a treaty are to be "taken liberally in the light of [its] evident
purposes"); see also Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 293 (1933) (noting that
a narrow and restricted construction of a treaty obligation should be avoided when
deciding between competing interpretations as not consonant with the principles
concerning the interpretation of international agreements).
54 See Anthony N. Bishop, The Unenforceable Rights To Consular Notification
and Access in the United States: What's Changed Since the LaGrand Case?, 25
Hous. J. INT'L L. 1, 45, n.259 (2002) ("the United States submitted an amendment
to Article 36(1)(b) proposing notification to the consul of a national's arrest or de-
tention be made at the request of the foreign national in order to protect the rights
of the foreign national") (internal citations omitted); see also U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
7 FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL, § 411.1 (1984), reprinted in Kadish, supra note 10, at
599 (stating that "Article 36 of the Vienna Consular Convention provides that the
host government must notify the arrestee without delay of the arrestee's right to
communicate with the American consul") (emphasis added).
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol18/iss1/4
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that Article 36 "endows a detained foreign national with indi-
vidual rights that are the counterpart to the host State's correl-
ative duties."55 It is also worth noting that at the Vienna
Conference itself, the U.S. delegation, aware of the issue con-
cerning the creation of private rights, proposed that the obliga-
tion of consular notification should depend upon the request of
the arrested or detained national in order "to protect the rights
of the national concerned." 56 In the Case Concerning LaGrand
(Germany v. United States),57 the ICJ determined that given its
history and the context in which it was adopted, Article 36(1)(b)
undoubtedly confers a right of enforcement upon an individual
detained or arrested.58 The Case Concerning Avena and Other
Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States)5 9 reiterated this
position, recognizing the complementarity and interdependence
of the provisions of Article 36 in relation to the rights of the
sending state and those of the individual.60
Insofar as the question of whether the Convention confers
judicially enforceable rights has been answered in the affirma-
55 See The Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of
the Guarantees of the Due Process Law, Advisory Opinion OC-16/99, Inter-Am.
C.H.R. 487, OEA/ser. L.N./III.47, doc. 6, 137 (2000) (noting that "nonobservance
of a detained foreign national's right to information recognized in Article 36(1)(b)
of the [Convention], is prejudicial to the guarantees of the due process of law")
[hereinafter Advisory Opinion OC-16/99]. For a more extensive analysis see Wil-
liam J. Aceves, International Decision: The Right to Information on Consular As-
sistance in the Framework of the Guarantees of Due Process of Law, Advisory
Opinion OC-16/99, 94 Am. J. INT'L L. 555 (2000).
56 See Conference on Consular Relations, Mar. 4-Apr. 22, 1963, 337, UN Doc.
A/Conf.25/6(1963) (emphasis added).
57 Case Concerning LaGrand (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 104 (June 27, 2001),
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/igus/igusframe.htm (last visited
Feb. 22, 2006).
58 See id. 77 (noting that "the clarity of [Article 36(1)(b) and (c)], viewed in
their context, admits of no doubt" that "Article 36, paragraph 1, creates individual
rights").
59 Case Concerning Avena & Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. U.S.) 2004
I.C.J. 128 (Mar. 31, 2004), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/imus/
imusframe.htm.
60 Indeed, the court expressly recognized that Article 36 confers rights upon
both the sending state as well as the individual. See Avena, 2004 I.C.J. 128, 40
(noting that "violations of the rights of the individual under Article 36 may entail a
violation of the rights of the sending State, and that violations of the rights of the
latter may entail a violation of the rights of the individual"); see also Bishop, supra
note 54, at 30 (recognizing in Article 36 the "correlative right of the [foreign na-
tional]... to contact the consular officer to obtain that assistance"); supra note 54
and accompanying text.
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tive by the ICJ as the result of a treaty based arbitral process to
which the United States agreed to be bound, it has been argued
that the resultant decisions should be no less binding than the
substantive provisions of the treaty itself.61 By this reasoning
the decisions of the ICJ in Avena and LaGrand should be given
direct effect in the state courts as a 'rule of decision'-having
arisen pursuant to the arbitral process under the Optional Pro-
tocol. At least one court has so held since LaGrand was de-
cided.62 Likewise, because the history of the Convention itself
as well as its textual interpretation by international courts in a
manner consistent with its 'apparent purpose' clearly support
an intention to create a private right of enforcement it is enti-
tled to judicial enforcement 63 and separately provides for a rule
of decision.
Certainly, even if LaGrand and Avena are not resorted to
as rules of decision, the United States nonetheless would seem
bound to these decisions under the United Nations Charter 64
(the U.N. Charter)-a treaty duly ratified by the United States
in 1945.65 Under Article 94(1) of the U.N. Charter, member
states are obligated to comply with ICJ decisions in matters to
which they were parties.66 This arguably compels the enforce-
ment of ICJ judgments in State courts. 67 Insofar as the ICJ
61 See Medellin v. Dretke, 125 S. Ct. 2088, 2102 (2005).
62 See United States ex rel. Madej v. Schomig, 223 F. Supp. 2d 968, 979 (N.D.
Ill. 2002) (granting relief on Sixth Amendment grounds but noting that the deci-
sion of the ICJ interpreting Article 36 is binding as a matter of federal law in that
it "conclusively ... creates individually enforceable rights, resolving the question
most American courts... have left open").
63 See Iannone v. Radory Const. Corp., 141 N.Y.S.2d 311, 315 (App. Div.
1955), affd 1 N.Y.2d 671 (recognizing that a self-executing treaty "must be applied
and given authoritative effect by the courts of this State"); see also Head Money
Cases, Edye v. Robertson, 112 U.S. 580, 588-99 (1884) (a court should "resort to [a
self-executing] treaty for a rule of decision . . .as it would to a statute").
64 See Charter of the United Nations, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. 993, 3 Bevans 1153
(Oct. 24, 1945) [hereinafter U.N. Charter].
65 As the third nation to join the United Nations, the United States ratified
the U.N. Charter on July 28, 1945.
66 See U.N. CHARTER, supra note 64, art. 94, 1 (providing in part that "[e]ach
Member of the United Nations undertakes to comply with the decision of the Inter-
national Court of Justice in any case to which it is a party).
67 There are inherent difficulties in obtaining private state enforcement of Ar-
ticle 94(1) to the extent that the U.N. Charter does not provide for a self-executing
remedy. See Comm. of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicar. v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 937
(1988). However, since the Charter mandates U.S. 'compliance' with ICJ determi-
nations, it is arguably nonetheless binding upon state courts as a matter of cus-
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol18/iss1/4
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would doubtlessly interpret Convention rights uniformly in any
given case, such judgments ought not be confined in application
to the factual peculiarities of the specific decisions.
Whether or not the ICJ judgments in LaGrand or Avena
are directly enforceable as rules of decision they are, together
with the interpretation of the IACHR, declarative of binding
substantive rights and obligations under the Convention as a
matter of customary international law. 68 Minimally, these in-
terpretations evidence an international consensus as to "an
agreed principle."69 As such, Breard v. Greene,70 in which the
Supreme Court remarked that Article 36 "arguably confers on
an individual the rights,"71 is hardly inconsistent with the hold-
ings of LaGrand and Avena, as well as the tenets of customary
international law on this issue.7 2 To the extent that there is an
inconsistency as to whether a remedy for the breach the Con-
vention may be precluded by state procedural default rules, it is
significant that Breard was decided well before Avena became a
tomary international law. See Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE
CONSTITUTION 460, n.61 (1972)(recognizing that the "violation of a treaty is essen-
tially a violation of the principle of customary international law that treaties be
observed"); see The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (providing that "in-
ternational law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by
the courts"); see also Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sover-
eignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and its Progeny, 100 HARv. L. REV. 853, 877
(1987) (arguing that [tihe framers of the Constitution respected the law of nations,
and... expected... the courts to give effect to that law").
68 See Philippe J. Sands, The Future of International Adjudication, 14 CoNN.
J. INT'L L. 1, 6 (1999) (noting that the Convention's "provisions are generally con-
sidered to reflect customary international law"); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD),
supra note 43, § 702(g) (providing that customary international law is binding on
federal and state governments); see also North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 1969
I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 20, 1969) (recognizing that provisions of multilateral conventions
may be applied as binding customary law where it is widely adopted and the prac-
tice is uniform and recognized as a legal obligation), available at http://www.icj-cij.
orglicjwww/idecisions/isummaries/icssummary690220.htm (last visited Feb. 22,
2006).
69 See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964).
70 See Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998).
71 See id. at 376.
72 See Case Concerning Avena & Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. U.S.)
2004 I.C.J. 128, T 84 (Mar. 31, 2004); Case Concerning LaGrand (F.R.G. v. U.S.),
2001 I.C.J. 104 T 97 (June 27, 2001) .
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final judgment.73 The Supreme Court has not since revisited
the issue on this precise question.
While it is true that in the absence of a specific designation,
procedural rules implementing substantive treaty provisions
are considered a matter domestic law;74 there is little, if any,
disagreement that the consular notification provisions of Article
36(1)(b) are substantive. Even if the notification requirements
of Article 36(1)(b) may be characterized as purely procedural to
the extent that they relate to the timing of the required no-
tice?without delay, state procedural rules must "enable full ef-
fect to be given to the purposes for which the rights accorded
under [Article 361 are intended"75-a different result would un-
doubtedly promote disharmony in the interpretation of multi-
lateral agreements contrary to U.S. foreign relations law76 and
undermine the fundamental principle of customary interna-
tional law requiring the discharge of treaty obligations in good
faith.77
B. Statutory Implications: CPL § 60.4578 and Involuntariness
Though New York court's have not often adjudicated claims
involving violations of Article 36, recently in People v. Ortiz,79
73 Breard was decided in 1998 whereas LaGrand was not decided until 2001
and Avena not until 2004.
74 See Breard, 523 U.S. at 375 (recognizing that in international law "absent a
clear and express statement to the contrary, the procedural rules of the forum
State govern the implementation of the treaty in that State").
75 See Vienna Convention, supra note 1, art. 36(2), 21 U.S.T. at 101, 596
U.N.T.S. at 292, 294. (emphasis added).
76 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw § 325, cmt. d (1987)
(providing that "treaties that lay down rules to be enforced by parties through
their internal courts or administrative agencies should be construed so as to
achieve uniformity of result despite differences between international legal
systems").
77 The principle of good faith (pacta sunt servanda) is a well established prin-
ciple of customary international law. See U.N. Charter, supra note 64, art. 2(2)
(requiring all member states to "fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed by
them in accordance with the present charter"); see also Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, art. 26, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331,
339 reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679, 690 [hereinafter VCLT] (providing that "[elvery
treaty in force ... must be performed by [the parties] in good faith"). While the
United States has not ratified this treaty, it is nonetheless considered an authori-
tative declaration of the norms of customary international law.
78 N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAw § 60.45 (McKinney 2004).
79 People v. Ortiz, 795 N.Y.S.2d 182 (App. Div. 2005).
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the Appellate Division, First Department, visited the issue of
whether a statement obtained in violation of Article 36 war-
ranted an instruction pursuant to New York Criminal Proce-
dure Law ("CPL") § 710.7080 permitting a jury to consider
whether the statement was involuntarily made. The court held
that, even assuming the Convention creates privately enforcea-
ble rights,8 ' the question of involuntariness within the meaning
of CPL § 60.45 is not implicated as a result of by the violation of
Article 36 to the extent that the Convention itself does not es-
tablish when the defendant must be informed of the right to
consular notification.8 2 To some extent this position is conso-
nant with the view of the ICJ which determined in Avena, that
the term 'without delay' does not necessarily require notifica-
tion immediately upon arrest and prior to interrogation.8 3 This
is because the notification provisions of Article 36, unlike 5th
and 6th Amendment 4 concerns, turn upon the detention of the
individual as distinguished from his interrogation.8 5
80 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 710.70 (McKinney 2004) states in relevant part:
"Nothing contained in this article [ ] precludes a defendant from attempting to
establish at a trial that evidence ... of a pre-trial statement made by him should
be disregarded... on the ground that [it] was involuntarily made within the mean-
ing of section 60.45 . . . [iun the case of a jury trial, the court must submit such
issue to the jury under instructions to disregard such evidence upon a finding that
the statement was involuntarily made."
81 See Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 375 (1998) (leaving the question of
whether the Convention confers individually enforceable rights unresolved, the
U.S. Supreme Court recognized that "[it] should give respectful consideration to
the interpretation of an international treaty rendered by an international court
with jurisdiction to interpret such"). Of note, is that the ICJ has since issued advi-
sory opinions indicating that Article 36 of the VCCR does in fact create substantive
personal rights. See Case Concerning Avena & Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico
v. U.S.) 2004 I.C.J. 128, (Mar. 31, 2004, 2004 I.C.J. 128; Case Concerning LaGrand
(F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 104 (June 27, 2001).
82 See Ortiz, 795 N.Y.S.2d at 183 (noting that "the treaty provision contains
no language requiring that a foreign national be advised, prior to police question-
ing, of his or her right to consular notification").
83 See Avena, 2004 I.C.J. 128, 87.
84 U.S. CONST. amend. V ("no person ... shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself'), U.S..CoNsT. amend.VI ("[iun all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to have the assistance of-counsel for
his defense").
85 See Lombera-Camorlinga, 206 F.3d 882, 886 (9th Cir. 2000)(noting "the
[Convention] does not link the required consular notification in any way to the
commencement of police interrogation. Nor does the treaty, as Miranda does, re-
quire law enforcement officials to cease interrogation once the arrestee invokes his
right").
20061
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In Avena, the ICJ interpreted the term 'without delay' as to
require advisement of the right to consular notification "as soon
as it is realized that the person is a foreign national, or once
there are grounds to think that the person is probably a foreign
national,"8 6 which for all practical purposes would likely pre-
cede the initiation of police interrogation. Thus, whether the
right to consular notification under Article 36 may be triggered
prior to interrogation,8 7 is not an issue necessary foreclosed by
the absence of definitive language contained within the text of
the Convention itself as Ortiz seems to suggest. Significantly,
the IACHR has interpreted the term "without delay" as ob-
taining "at the moment [foreign nationals] are deprived of lib-
erty and, in any case, before they make their first statements to
the authorities."8 8 As a signatory to the American Convention
on Human Rights ("ACHR"),8 9 although not bound by its terms
as a party, the United States is nonetheless obligated to accord
it respect in good faith.90
Minimally therefore, the question of precisely when the
right arises and its impact on the voluntariness of the subse-
quent statement under C.P.L. § 60.45(2)(b)(ii) would seem to de-
volve upon a question of fact. Insofar as a claim of traditional
'involuntariness' will ultimately rest upon a factual showing, it
86 See Avena, 2004 I.C.J. 128, 88.
87 See id. 63 (recognizing that "precisely when this may occur will vary with
circumstances"); see also United States v. Alvarado-Torres, 45 F. Supp. 2d at 991
(suggesting that notification should occur before a suspect is booked).
88 See Advisory Opinion OC-16/99, supra note 55, [ 106, 108, 110 (providing
that a failure to advise foreign nationals of their rights under Article 36 "at the
time the accused is deprived of his freedom, or at least before he makes his first
statements before the authorities" constitutes a violation of the Convention and in
the context of capital cases, amounts to a deprivation of due process).
89 American Convention on Human Rights, art. 33, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144
U.N.T.S. 123, 153.
90 The U.S. is a charter member of the Organization of American States
("OAS") and a signatory to the American Convention on Human Rights ("ACHR").
To the extent that the Inter-American Court of Human Rights ("IACHR") is vested
with the authority to implement the ACHR and is also possessed of the comple-
mentary capacity to issue advisory opinions as the judicial arm of the OAS, the
United States may not engage in conduct intended to defeat its object or purpose.
It is well established that a treaty signatory (subject to ratification) is required to
refrain from such acts. See VCLT, supra note 77, art. 18. Though the United
States is not a party to the VCLT it is nonetheless regarded as binding, though not
in its entirety, upon non-parties to the extent it is "declaratory of existing [interna-
tional] law." See Henkin, Pugh, Schachter, & Smit, INTERNATIONAL LAw 387 (2d
ed. 1987).
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is important for the practitioner to frame the Article 36 claim
factually in terms of its impact upon the decision of the accused
to make a statement to the authorities and not merely as deriv-
ative of a breach of the Convention.
Preliminarily, in the context of a statement elicited from a
defendant, it will be necessary to demonstrate that the right to
consular notification under the Convention arose before the in-
terrogation took place and the resulting statement was given.
For instance, one might allege simply that the defendant did
not speak any English or was born abroad-which ought to pro-
vide a reasonable law enforcement officer with some basis to
think that the person is 'probably a foreign national.' Similarly,
it is useful to identify the specific breach in the protocol to have
been accorded the noncitizen upon arrest or detention, such as
those required under New York City Police Department guide-
lines or those recommended specifically to state law enforce-
ment agencies by the U.S. Department of State.91 To the extent
however, that the Convention (even where complied with) does
not require that an interrogation be delayed until communica-
tion between the national and his consulate has actually oc-
curred, a broader foundation should be set forth. Thus, the
practitioner should seek to allege facts demonstrating that the
statement would not have been made by the defendant had the
state authorities complied with the terms of the Convention-
this directly responds to a prejudice analysis 92 that has been
employed in determining the appropriate measure of redress
under the auspices of the Convention, more fully addressed be-
low (as distinguished from one derivative of constitutional au-
thority).9 3 For example, the practice of the relevant consulate
91 See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PUB. No. 10518, supra note 13, at 13.
92 See United States v. Ore-Irawa, 78 F. Supp. 2d 610, 613 (E.D. Mich. 1999);
see United States v. Tapia-Mendoza, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1250, 1254 (D. Utah 1999);
United States v. Briscoe, 69 F. Supp. 2d 738, 747 (D. Va. 1999), affd without pub-
lished opinion, 234 F.3d 1266 (3d Cir. 2000); Alvarado-Torres, 45 F. Supp. 2d at
989-90; United States v. Esparza-Ponce, 7 F. Supp. 2d 1084, 1097 (S.D. Cal. 1998).
See also Rangel-Gonzales, 617 F.2d 529, 533 (9th Cir. 1980) (applying a tripartite
test of prejudice requiring that the defendant demonstrate: (1) that he did not
know of his right to consular notification; (2) that he would have availed himself of
that right; and (3) that there was a likelihood that contact with the consul would
have resulted in assistance to him).
93 See John Cary Sims & Linda E. Carter, Representing Foreign Nationals:
Emerging Importance of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations as a Defense
2006]
19
PACE INT'L L. REV.
in rendering assistance should be documented, significantly ad-
dressing whether it advises its nationals and explains to them
their right not to make statements; 94 whether it actively in-
structs nationals not to make such statements to the police and
prosecutors in the absence of counsel; or whether it assists in
the procurement or immediate retention of counsel for the bene-
fit of a national. 95 In fact, consular officers have the right to
arrange for the legal representation of a national under the
Convention 96 and to the extent this may be interfered with by
law enforcement officials may figure into the question of volun-
tariness with regard to a subsequently obtained statement.
It is well recognized that "[d]etained foreign nationals are
inevitably distressed by the prospect of securing and preserving
their rights in a legal system with whose institutions and rules
they are not familiar."97 This is not a condition necessarily as-
suaged by representation of local counsel, thus interference
with the ability of the consulate to secure counsel for a national
may have serious implications on the question of voluntariness.
C. Remedies
There has been considerable debate on the question of what
remedy one should obtain in the face of a violation of the Con-
vention. A few things however are clear. In principle at least, it
is well recognized that a violation of international law requires
a substantive remedy. In this situation "[t]he objective of resti-
Tool, THE CHAMPION, Sept./Oct. 1998, available at http://www.nacdl.org/CHAM-
PION/Articles/98sepOl.htm; see also Waldron v. Immigration and Naturalization
Serv., 17 F.3d 511, 518 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1014 (1994) (noting
that while no showing of prejudice needs to be made to warrant a remedy of a
constitutionally-based violation, prejudice must be demonstrated to warrant a
remedy for a violation of a non-fundamental right).
94 United States v. Rodrigues, 68 F. Supp. 2d 178, 184-85 (E.D.N.Y. 1999)
(providing that prejudice may be shown by demonstrating that "the local consular
official's regular practice is to appear immediately after a national's arrest and
advise him or her not to submit to questioning").
95 See Sandra L. Babcock, Vienna Convention On Consular Relations: Litiga-
tion Strategies, Apr. 15, 2005, http://www.capdefnet.org/fdprc/contents/relevant-
reading/101001-01.htm#2 (last visited Mar. 25, 2006).
96 See Vienna Convention, supra note 1, art. 36(1)(c).
97 Memorandum from Lawyers Committee for Human Rights on Consular No-
tification and Access to All Interested Persons (Nov. 29, 2001), http://www.cdt.org
security/011129Lchr.pdf (last visited Feb. 16, 2006) (citing Telegram 40298 from
Department of State to Embassy Damascus (Feb. 21, 1975)).
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tutio in integrum (a principle of reparation) is [applied] to bring
the legal situation in question to its status quo ante, that is to
the state that existed before the illegal act was committed."98
The ICJ has thus determined that "a procedure which guaran-
tees that full weight is given to the violation of the rights set
forth in the Vienna Convention"99 should be applied in review
and reconsideration of the conviction and sentence proceed-
ings. 10 0 In particular, this process of 'review and reconsidera-
tion' should be undertaken "with a view to ascertaining whether
... the violation of Article 36... caused actual prejudice to the
defendant." 1° 1 How this precisely translates in the context of
state criminal procedural rules is as yet unclear, though courts
have, with near uniformity, rejected the notion that a violation
of the consular notification provisions may implicate the exclu-
sionary rule, normally reserved for constitutional violations. 10 2
In Waldron v. INS,'0 3 the Second Circuit adopted the position
taken by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)
that failure of the authorities to inform the defendant of his
Convention rights did not constitute a violation of fundamental
98 See Petros C. Mavroidis, Remedies in the WTO Legal System: Between a
Rock and a Hard Place 11 EUR. J. INT'L L. 763, 768 (2000), available at http://www.
ejil.org/journal/Volll/No4l10763.pdf; see also Babcock, supra note 95 (noting that
"[u]nder international law, the recognized remedy for a treaty violation is to re-
store the status quo ante. .. ").
99 See Case Concerning Avena & Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. U.S.)
2004 I.C.J. 128, 139 (Mar. 31, 2004.
100 Id. 129; see also Case Concerning LaGrand (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J.
104 9T 125 (June 27, 2001).
101 See Avena, 2004 I.C.J. 128, 121.
102 See Lombera-Camorlinga, 206 F.3d 882, 886 (9th Cir. 2000)(noting that "an
exclusionary rule is typically only available for constitutional violations, not for
statutory or treaty violations"); United States v. Martinez-Villava, 80 F. Supp. 2d
1152, 1155-56 (D. Colo. 1999); United States v. Orelrawa, 78 F. Supp. 2d 610, 613-
14 (E.D. Mich. 1999); United States v. Tapia-Mendoza, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1250, 1253-
55 (D. Utah 1999); United States v. Salameh, 54 F.Supp.2d 236, 279 (S.D.N.Y.
1999); cf. Delaware v. Reyes, 740 A.2d 7, 14 (Del. Super. Ct. 1999) (suppressing
statements taken by police prior to the administration of Article 36 rights, relying
on Article 36(2) which prohibits the application of procedures failing to accord full
effect to treaty rights) (The Reyes decision was subsequently overruled. See State
v. Vasquez, 2001 WL 755930 (Del. Super. Ct. 2001)).
103 Waldron v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 17 F.3d 511 (2d Cir.
1993).
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rights toward which the remedy of exclusion is aimed. 10 4 This
position has been followed by many courts, which hierarchically
distinguish between constitutional and treaty violations in
terms of their 'fundamental' character, thus reserving the appli-
cation of the exclusionary rule to conduct in dereliction of "those
paramount protections secured by the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth
Amendments." 10 5 While the exclusionary rule may not be ap-
plied as a matter of law, the underlying factual basis that might
otherwise indicate its application may still be explored as a fac-
tor in a traditional involuntariness analysis. Though eviden-
tiary suppression as derived under the 'exclusionary rule' has
been largely interdicted as an available remedy for treaty viola-
tions, it is unclear that a procedural rule of preclusion could not
otherwise be applied in furtherance of the State's obligation
under principles of customary international law10 6 to act in con-
formity with normative expectations regarding rights expressed
in Article 36 and to engage the principle of pacta sunt servanda.
In New York for example, the receipt of evidence at trial
may be precluded as a result of the violation of a variety of pro-
cedural rules, among them CPL § 710.30 which requires the
prosecution to give notice of an intention to introduce statement
or identification evidence at trial. 0 7 In addition, under CPL
§ 240.70, the state's evidence may be precluded as a sanction for
the failure to abide by pretrial discovery rules. l08 Evidence of a
104 See id. at 518 (noting that "although compliance with our treaty obligations
clearly is required, we decline to equate such a provision with fundamental
rights").
105 See United States v. Li, 206 F.3d 56, 61 (1st Cir. 2000).
106 See Julian Ku, The State of New York Does Exist: How the States Control
Compliance with International Law, 82 N.C. L. REv. 457, 463 (2004) (pointing out
that "states have played a central role in compliance with treaty and customary
international law obligations affecting probate proceedings, local property and gas-
oline tax immunities, injuries to alien residents, notaries, family law, commercial
law, and other areas" and also noting that they continue to "play a much more
significant and substantial role in the implementation of international law obliga-
tions than most commentators have recognized").
107 See N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAw § 710.30(3) (McKinney 2006) (providing, in rele-
vant part, that "[iin the absence of service of notice upon a defendant as prescribed
in this section, no evidence of a kind specified in subdivision one may be received
against him upon trial...").
108 Id. § 240.70(1) (providing that "[i]f, during the course of discovery proceed-
ings, the court finds that a party has failed to comply with any of the provisions of
this article, the court may ... prohibit the introduction of certain evidence or the
calling of certain witnesses. .. ).
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defense may similarly be barred where an accused fails to abide
by the provisions of CPL §§ 250.20 or 250.10 requiring notice of
alibi or of an intention to offer psychiatric evidence, respec-
tively. v0 9 In federal court, the McNabb-Mallory rule provides
for suppression of confessions that are obtained following a vio-
lation of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 5(a) concerning
unnecessary delays in arraignment. 110 Evidentiary preclusion
is thus commonly applied in the case of procedural violations
even where they manifestly fail to rise to a level impacting upon
fundamental rights or otherwise affecting the reliability of the
evidence.
Some courts have rationalized the inapplicability of the ex-
clusionary rule to Convention violations on the ground that it
would be "self limiting"-that is, "no country which has ratified
the treaty has applied such a remedy." 1' Of course, the accu-
racy of this assessment was tested by at least two English deci-
sions, R. v. Bassil and Mouffareg"1 2 and R. v. van Axe111 3 both of
which resulted in the exclusion of statements obtained in viola-
109 Id. § 250.20(3) (providing in relevant part that "[i]f at the trial the defen-
dant calls ... an alibi witness without having served the demanded notice of alibi
[on the prosecution] ... the court may exclude any testimony of such witness relat-
ing to the alibi defense"); see id. § 250.10(2) (providing in relevant part that
"[p]sychiatric evidence is not admissible upon a trial unless the defendant serves
upon the people and files with the court a written notice of his intention to present
psychiatric evidence"); see also People v. Almonor, 715 N.E.2d 1054, 1060 (1999)
(noting that the absence of timely notice results in an evidentiary bar to the intro-
duction of a psychiatric defense).
110 See Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 455-56 (1957); McNabb v.
United States, 318 U.S. 332, 341-42 (1943); Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S.
410, 414 (1948) (all holding inadmissible confessions obtained during an unneces-
sary delay in arraignment); see also United States v. Alvarez-Sanchez, 975 F.2d
1396, 1400-01 (9th Cir. 1992), rev'd on other grounds, 511 U.S. 3500 (1994) (re-
marking that "there must be circumstances in which delay in arraignment will
require suppression of a confession regardless of the voluntariness of the confes-
sion"); FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(a) (providing in relevant part that an arrested person be
brought before a magistrate "without unnecessary delay").
111 See United States v. Rodrigues, 68 F. Supp. 2d 178, 186 (E.D.N.Y. 1999);
but see R. v. Bassil and Mouffareg, (1990) 28 July, Acton Crown Court, HHJ Sich,
reported in Legal Action 23, December 1990; see also R. v. VanAxel and Wezer
(1991) 31 May, Snaresbrook Crown Court, HHJ Sich, reported in Legal Action 12,
September 1991.
112 [1990] 28 July, Acton Crown Court, HHJ Sich, reported in LEGAL ACTION
23, Dec. 1990.
113 [1991] 31 May, Snaresbrook Crown Court, HHJ Sich, reported in LEGAL Ac-
TION 12, Sept. 1991.
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tion of consular notification requirements. While the decisions
hinged on parallel requirements under the relevant domestic
procedural codes, 114 the courts considered the following factors
significant: the defendants relative unfamiliarity with the Brit-
ish legal system; their lack of sophistication and; in Bassil, the
defendants' language difficulties and the fact that they hailed
from a country where the assertion of rights by criminal defend-
ants is minimally considered ill advised. 115 The Bassil court de-
termined that the failure to advise the defendants of their right
to consular notification effectively prevented the entrance of an
official who spoke the defendants' language from assisting them
in "reaching an informed decision about their position, and
[whom] might well have advised them to obtain the services of a
solicitor and interpreter before being interviewed."" 6
These cases illustrate the application of both aspects of the
enforcement of consular rights raised in this article to the ex-
tent that they implicitly recognize the enforceability of such
rights (albeit as a matter domestic police procedure) and
demonstrate the relationship of those rights to the concept of
voluntariness as it relates to statements. Accordingly, there is
some basis for the position that the application of the exclusion-
ary rule is, in fact, not "self-limiting" but entirely consonant
with the interpretation of the treaty as well as the practice of its
members as a matter of customary international law.
Legislation codifying Convention rights and attendant pro-
cedures in the United States has thus far been slow and insular,
having been adopted in only a handful of states. 1 7 How future
114 See Police and Criminal Evidence Act of 1984, c. 60, § 66 (Eng.) (revised as
of August 2004) Code C, sec. 7, available at http://police.homeoffice.gov.uk/news-
and-publications/publication/operational-policing/PreviousCodes_2004 (provid-
ing for the right of a detained foreign national to be informed "as soon as practica-
ble" of his right to communicate with the appropriate high commission, embassy or
consulate).
115 See R. v. Bassil & Mouffareg, [1990] 28 July, Acton Crown Court, HHJ Sich,
reported in LEGAL ACTION 23, Dec. 1990; R. v. van Axel, [1991] 31 May,
Snaresbrook Crown Court, HHJ Sich, reported in LEGAL ACTION 12, Sept. 1991.
116 See Trainer, supra note 4, at 267, n.248 (internal citations omitted).
117 For an extensive discussion, see Mark Warren, Consular Notification: Stat-
utory and Regulatory Provisions, (Nov. 2005), http://www3.sympatico.ca/aiwarren/
compliance.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2006); see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 834c(a)(1)
(2000) (mandating notification of the right to communicate with a consular official
upon "arrest and booking or detention for more than two hours or a known or sus-
pected foreign national"). The code further requires such notification to occur
24http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol18/iss1/4
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breaches of these provisions will be treated in state courts how-
ever remains to be seen. Though many courts have determined
that remedial action is appropriate for Article 36 breaches,"18
those courts have conditioned redress upon a showing of
prejudice. 119 This standard however, is not coextensive with
the requirement of "review and reconsideration" as set forth in
LaGrand. On the contrary, it imposes upon the defendant the
obligation to demonstrate prejudice as a result of the failure of
consular notice 20 rather than upon the state to demonstrate
the lack thereof in full consideration of the trial and sentencing
process.' 21 Nonetheless, even where the domestic standard is
met the extent of any consequent remedy remains elusive.
Though some courts have expressed "doubt" that without dem-
onstrating a direct effect on the trial a Convention violation
could not result in the overturning of a verdict 122 or the dismis-
"without delay," specifically incorporating the Vienna Convention. Id. § 834(b).
See also FLA. STAT. ch. 288.816(2) (2005) (implicitly requiring Florida authorities
to notify the embassy or consulate upon the arrest a foreign national in compliance
with the Vienna Convention), available at http://www.flsenate.gov (follow "Stat-
utes & Constitution" hyperlink: then follow " View Statutes" hyperlink); OR. REV.
STAT. § 426.228(9)(a) (2003) (requiring consular notification when an officer "rea-
sonably suspects that the person is a foreign national"), available at http://www.
oregonlawyer.com (follow "Oregon Revised Statutes hyperlink).
118 The First, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have found that judicial remedies
exist, with respect to a violation of Article 36. See United States v. Li, 206 F.3d 56,
62 (1st Cir. 2000); Lombera-Camorlinga, 206 F.3d 882, 891 (9th Cir. 2000); United
States v. Cordoba-Mosquera, 212 F.3d 1194, 1196 (11th Cir. 2000).
119 See id.
120 See United States v. Proa-Tovar, 975 F.2d 592, 594-95 (9th Cir. 1992) (cre-
ating a tripartite test to ascertain prejudice).
121 See Case Concerning LaGrand (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 104 74 (June
27, 2001)(holding as to the issue of prejudice that "[i]t is immaterial ... whether
the LaGrands would have sought consular assistance from Germany, whether Ger-
many would have rendered such assistance, or whether a different verdict would
have been rendered. It is sufficient that the Convention conferred [Article 36]
rights, and that Germany and the LaGrands were in effect prevented by the
breach of the United States from exercising them, had they so chosen"); cf. Her-
nandez v. United States, 280 F. Supp. 2d 118, 124-25 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (noting that
the defendant must adduce evidence that consultation with the consulate would
have changed the actions he undertook in the case, or altered its outcome). See also
supra note 91, and accompanying text.
122 See Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 371 (1998).
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sal of an indictment, 123 lesser effective sanctions may exist to be
pursued to the benefit of a client. 124
In Delaware v. Reyes,125 for example, the court determined
that an exclusionary sanction was appropriate where the defen-
dant had timely and adequately demonstrated a cognizable
prejudice.1 26 In Yater,127 a British national was brought to trial
in Italy and convicted of certain offenses in the absence of con-
sular notification. 28  The Italian Supreme Court (Corte
Suprema di Cassazione) addressed the specific issue of whether
Yater had been effectively deprived of his right to legal repre-
sentation to the extent that Article 36(c) provides that the con-
sulate may assist in the securing of counsel. The Court
determined that the rights to consular notification were "com-
plementary and subsidiary intervention[s] which do[ ] not re-
place the accused's right to provide for himself a trusted legal
representative for his defence."129 Since the defendant was rep-
resented by counsel of his own choosing, the Court determined
that there was "no violation of the procedural rules regarding
the accused's defence as a result of failure to inform the said
authority." 30 The decision did not address the situation
wherein the defendant is represented by counsel other than his
own choosing. Unless Yater is erroneously read to mean that an
Article 36(c) claim is negatived where a foreign national simply
123 See United States v. Awadullah, 202 F. Supp. 2d 17, 40 (S.D.N.Y.2002);
United States v. Duarte-Acera, 132 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1038 (S.D. Fla. 2002) (both
cases denying a motion to dismiss the indictment); see also United States v. Cowo,
2004 WL 1474774 (1st Cir. 2001) (unpublished disposition) (internal citations
omitted) (holding that dismissal of the indictment is not an appropriate remedy for
Article 36 violations); United States v. De La Pava, 268 F.3d 157, 163 (2d Cir.
2001)(finding that Article 36 violations does not require the court to dismiss the
indictments).
124 See United States v. Tapia-Mendoza, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1250, 1255 n.2 (D.
Utah 1999)(holding suppression unavailable as a remedy for Convention violations
while expressly "not foreclose[ing] the possibility that other remedies may be
available").
125 Delaware v. Reyes, 740 A.2d 7 (Del. Super. Ct. 1999) (The Reyes decision
was subsequently overruled. See State v. Vasquez, 2001 WL 755930 (Del. Super.
Ct. 2001)).
126 See id. at 14-15.
127 In re Yater, 77 INT'L L. REP. 541 (Italy, Court of Cassation 1973).
128 See id.
129 Id. at 542.
130 Id. at 541.
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has a lawyer, which is clearly not the case, 131 the Court's hold-
ing necessarily implies that where the Convention breach cir-
cumvents the ability of the defendant to obtain counsel of his
own choosing, prejudice arguably remains. Accordingly, it is a
tack that ought to be pursued, particularly where the defendant
is or has been represented by appointed counsel.
In Torres v. Oklahoma, 32 the defendant was granted an ev-
identiary hearing as to whether he was prejudiced by the
State's violation of the Convention and the extent of the remedy
to be provided as a result. In remanding the matter to the lower
court, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals applied Avena,
recognizing it as binding authority. 33 Indeed, the concurrence
of Judge Charles S. Chapel argued that courts are bound to give
full faith and credit to Avena. 134 Moreover, to the extent that
there exists an obligation to review and reconsider the convic-
tion and sentence in light of the violation of the rights of an
accused under the Convention, this carries with it correlative
obligation to "fulfill the goal of a fair and just review."135 On
remand however, the lower court never reached the issue of de-
termining the appropriate remedy for the demonstrable
prejudice proffered by Torres before the Court. Instead, the
matter was resolved shortly after the appellate decision, with
the commutation of Torres' death sentence to one of life impris-
onment by the Oklahoma governor. 136 The accompanying press
release remarked that the granting of the clemency petition was
predicated in part upon the view that the ICJ's ruling in Avena
was binding on U.S. courts and that account should be taken of
the fact that the United States is a party to the Convention. 137
The significance of Torres in terms of the scope of potential rem-
131 See, John Quigley, Suppressing the Incriminating Statements of Foreigners,
13 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 339, 359 (2004) (internal citations omitted).
132 Torres v. Oklahoma, No. PCD-04-422 (Okla. Crim. App. 2004) (unpublished
opinion). See also Torres v. State, 120 P.2d 1184, 1186-88 (Okla. Crim. App. 2005)
(discussing the lower court's decision).
133 See Murphy, supra note 14, at 583 (internal citations omitted).
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 Press Release, Office of Governor Brad Henry, Governor Henry Grants
Clemency to Death Row Inmate Torres (May 13, 2004), available at http://www.
governor.state.ok.us (follow "News & Info" hyperlink; then follow "2004 Press Re-
leases" hyperlink; then follow "May" hyperlink)).
137 Id.
20061
27
PACE INT'L L. REV.
edies for Convention violations is encouraging and suggests
that a genuinely meaningful review of the merits of such claims
is both warranted and required of state courts.
V. PRACTICAL INDICATIONS
Defense counsel often ascertains at arraignment the na-
tionality and immigration status of a client with an eye towards
potential collateral consequences. It is equally important for
defense counsel to consider seeking consular involvement in the
case of a foreign national at the earliest possible stage in the
process. There are of course several factors outside the scope of
this article worthy of consideration in the context of asserting a
claim under the Convention, among them: the ramifications of
notifying the sending state of the particulars of the arrest or
detention; the risk of drawing attention to the defendant's im-
migration status and the possibility of the initiation of deporta-
tion proceedings; the policies of the sending state and any
potential action it may undertake against a national having
been arrested and charged with a crime in the United States;
and perhaps most importantly, the severity of the charges. As
with any choice in legal advocacy, this article does not posit a
definitive approach that is appropriate in all circumstances-
invariably counsel must balance the possible negative conse-
quences of making the country in question aware of the inci-
dent, the severity of the charges and value of consular
assistance in view of advancing a claim under the Convention.
Where defense counsel does determine that an Article 36
claim may be advantageous in a particular case, a motion re-
questing that the state both formally advise the defendant of
the right to consular notification as well as notify the consulate
of the defendant's status should be filed as soon as possible.
This will potentially involve the consulate in the assistance of
the client as well as create and preserve a record for an ap-
peal. 138 The benefits of consular involvement may include help
that the detained person might not otherwise receive. For in-
stance, the consulate may be able to facilitate the relationship
and communication between counsel and client, assist with lan-
guage barriers, provide access to material records, make provi-
138 See generally Sims & Carter, supra note 93.
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sions for the retention of supplementary counsel, as well as aid
in the location and procurement of mitigating evidence abroad,
often critical to the disposition of a case. The consulate may
also be in a better position to explain the functioning and the
nuances of the state criminal justice system to the client and in
particular, to communicate the role of the defense attorney as a
trusted advocate for the client rather than an arm of the state-
a factor at times presenting a formidable obstacle to an effective
defense strategy.
A review of the procedure and any paperwork generated
with regard to the arrest of a noncitizen may also be useful to
defense counsel in building an appellate record139 and in includ-
ing fact specific additions to a request for a bill of particulars
and demand for discovery. It is important for counsel to famil-
iarize herself with the particulars of any law enforcement proto-
cols or procedures in place regarding consular notification upon
the arrest or detention of a foreign national. For example, Pro-
cedure No. 208-56 of the New York City Police Department Pa-
trol Guide mandates the observance of a very specific protocol
regarding such arrests or detentions. 140 Minimally, an aware-
ness of the applicable procedures may prove useful at the hear-
ing or trial stages for purposes of expanding the scope of
discovery and cross-examination.
VI. CONCLUSION
At least one court perceives the right to consular access as
conferring upon foreign nationals extra-constitutional protec-
tions unavailable to citizens. 14 1 Apart from elucidating this un-
139 The importance of developing a thorough record at the state level cannot be
overstated. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 86 (1977) (providing that claims
of error must first be raised in state court before it they be asserted as the basis of
federal habeas relief); see also, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
(AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a), (e)(2) (providing that a habeas petitioner claiming
to be held in violation of"treaties of the United States" is not entitled to an eviden-
tiary hearing where there has been a "fail[ure] to develop the factual basis of [the]
claim in the State court proceedings").
140 See New York City Police Department Patrol Guide, Procedure 208-56 (Feb.
28, 2001) (requiring among several procedures attendant to noncitizen arrests that
an arresting officer inform an alien "prisoner of right to have embassy or consulate
notified.").
141 See Waldron v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 17 F.3d 511, 517 (2d
Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1014 (1994). See also James A. Deeken, A New
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fortunate irony, it is important for counsel to emphasize to the
court that the purpose of the right is "[t]o minimize the disad-
vantages experienced by accused foreigners" 142 whether here or
elsewhere. Thus, it is the vigorous protection of consular rights
that reciprocally advances the interests of American nationals
that are detained abroad. 143 Conversely, the continued failure
to recognize or enforce these rights at home seriously imperils
the future viability of the Convention's framework, upon which
the United States depends in the extraterritorial protection of
its nationals.
While the case law is as yet unsettled, an analysis of the
legislative history of the Vienna Conference clearly points to-
ward a well considered multilateral intention to confer pri-
vately enforceable rights upon foreign nationals under the
Convention. There are avenues that a given defendant may
pursue to her advantage in the litigation of Article 36 claims,
whether it be in the form of a direct remedy for a breach of the
attendant obligations or through advancing the issue as a factor
in the context of an involuntariness claim as to statements or
their fruits, as a matter of law. As this issue is addressed by
courts in the future, it is imperative that criminal defense attor-
neys in New York raise the issues concerned for a myriad of
reasons to the potential benefit of clients, not the least of which
is the preservation of an adequate appellate record for the fu-
ture decisions that will ultimately define state law with regard
to the enforcement of consular notification rights.
Furthermore, the continued litigation of these issues may
bring to fruition positive legislation in New York as it has in
others, recognizing the significance of Article 36 rights and tak-
ing substantial steps toward its implementing its enforcement.
Though "[p]rosecutors and defense attorneys alike should be
Miranda For Foreign Nationals? The Impact of Federalism on International Trea-
ties that Place Affirmative Obligations on State Governments in the Wake of Printz
v. United States, 31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 997, 1025 (1998).
142 See S.A. Shank & John Quigley, Foreigners on Texas's Death Row and the
Right of Access to a Consul, 26 ST. MARY'S L.J. 719, 721 (1995).
143 See ELEANOR McDOWELL, DIGEST OF U.S. PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
249-50 (1975) (providing that "[sitates accord these rights to other states in the
confident expectation that if the situation were to be reversed they would be ac-
corded equivalent rights to protect their nationals") (quoting Department of State,
Telegram 40298 to Embassy Damascus, Feb. 21, 1975).
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aware of the rights conferred by the treaty and their responsi-
bilities under it,"144 it is the obligation of defense counsel to en-
sure that the courts are not excepted.
144 See Breard v. Pruett, 134 F.3d 615, 622 (4th Cir. 1998) (Butzner, J.,
concurring).
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